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Justice, Citizenship, Social Cohesion And The Commons 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University  
Preliminary Comments 
 I’d like to thank you for inviting me to speak here this morning. Nancy and I 
were especially pleased to get away from all the heat and sunshine of July in West 
Virginia, with the flowers in bloom, and have a chance to revisit winter here. 
 I’ve had continuing contact with a number of you over the years as you came the 
other way for conferences – Mark Lyons and Myles MacGregor Lownes, in 
particular. And I’ve been in email contact with a larger number of you through the 
ARNOVA-L list server and other electronic linkages. I learned that email was a real 
communication medium late one Saturday night a few years ago when I shared a 
round of memos in rapid-fire succession with Susan Keen. We were talking about 
disasters and I was able to tell Susan of the devastation of flooding in West 
Virginia, while she told me a particularly harrowing story about her family being 
trapped in a wildfire while on vacation. 
Introduction 
We are here today because of our shared view that nonprofit organizations, 
voluntary action and philanthropy are among the most basic, interesting and 
important categories of civilized social life. Increasingly, those of us engaged in 
what has become known as third sector research are also coming to share a growing 
realization that the phenomena which are of greatest interest and concern to us are 
also of central importance in many of the larger practical and theoretical issues of 
our time. 
Certainly, this is true theoretically. In the beginning of their voluminous work 
reviewing and updating continental traditions on civil society, Cohen & Arato (1992, 
1) claim that "We are on the threshold of another great transformation of the self-
understanding of modern societies.”   Even our labels in common use today – words 
like post-modern and post-industrial – support the impression that something big is 
happening even though we are not yet in agreement about what it may be or what 
to call it. 
The reasons for the great ferment in political and social theory have in large 
measure to do with our understanding that a number of major changes are taking 
place in the larger social world and our understandings of it. These include:  a)  The 
crisis of the welfare state; b) The emergence of open – or is it more correct to say 
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democratic? market? pluralistic? – societies in Russia, Central Europe, Latin 
America and many of the countries of the Pacific Rim;	c)		A	general	movement	away	
from class/stratification and toward group membership as central themes for 
national politics in many countries;  d)  The collapse – or at least major crisis – of 
the modernization paradigm which keeps most social scientists locked into the 
investigation of purely contemporary phenomena in the specious present;  e) The 
emergence of a truly-global economy; and f) the emergence of the internet as a 
global communications medium. Each of these has major implications for our 
understandings of the common themes of this conference -- citizenship, justice and 
voluntary associations.  
Many of us who are here also share a common English language, and a common 
heritage that is said to be either colonial or imperial, depending upon your vantage 
point. The Maori-Pakeha culture of New Zealand has much in common with what 
I’m sure the Inuit call the Canadian problem and the Navaho and the 600 or so 
Amerindian peoples within the boundaries of the U.S. experience as the American 
problem. Most of us also share a liberal political preference for justice that has been 
hard to reconcile with actual events for a very long time now. One of the points that 
I hope to highlight in my status as a visitor from the U.S., is the relative neglect of 
the English-language, urban-industrial democracies of New Zealand, Australia, the 
U.S., Canada, post-war Britain and South Africa as a subset of the “first world” for 
research purposes. Following increasingly common practice among Native American 
and Hispanic scholars in the American southwest and others, I am going to refer to 
us generally as the “Anglo” countries. 
In a certain very real sense, contemporary thinking about nonprofit 
organizations and the third sector is still conditioned by a three-worlds view of the 
planet:  The “first world” is the world of industrial democracies, with their 
developed economies, but also their mediating institutional frameworks of civil 
society: rights, associations and publics (Cohen & Arato, 1992). Until 1989, the 
“second world” was equally clearly the world of totalitarianism, in which the 
suppression or cooptation of associations by the state was a defining characteristic. 
And the third world?  Linking third sector activity to modernization has had clear 
implications for the assumed absence of any semblance of a third sector from the 
third world; implications which are fortunately being remedied in your time by the 
so-called associational revolution. The key question is whether the necessary 
revolution is in the third world or in our (western) understandings? The clear 
assumption behind the so-called associational revolution is a Hobbesian one:  That 
third world residents have lived mean, brutish existences as primitives in a state of 
nature without virtue of mediating institutions other than extended family and 
tribe, prior to the recent advent of western style nonprofit organizations.  
It is in this context that I would ask you to consider my work The Commons: 
New Perspectives on Nonprofit Organization, Voluntary Action and Philanthropy 
(Lohmann, 1992). As some of you may know, my work involves use of the concept of 
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the commons as a typological device for looking beyond the rather narrow world of 
nonprofit corporations and American-style “third sectors” to related phenomena.  
The Maori political renaissance of recent decades in New Zealand is of a piece 
with developments in the rest of the Anglo world, although what is happening 
among the native peoples of New Zealand, Canada, Australia, or South Africa are 
very distinct from what is happening in the U.S.  
To make the category more or less complete, in post-war Britain, the tables are 
turned and the ‘native peoples’ are all white, English speaking Anglo-Saxon 
protestants. Things there are still in a first stage like that noted by both Cornell 
(1988) and Fleras and Elliott (1992) in which peaceful coexistence is sought, the 
immigrants are still a minority and have not yet gained the upper hand politically. 
One can begin to get an appreciation of the position of ‘native peoples’ by imagining 
what would happen to our Anglo world view if the land of Shakespeare, of Henry 
and Victoria and Wellington, of Hobbes and Locke, Berkeley and all the rest were to 
come out of the present fuss over Charles and Diana under the political domination 
of an immigrant majority working actively to suppress all vestiges of the ‘ignorant, 
superstitious, benighted and inferior’ English culture.  
I apologize to our Maori cohosts, but I must mention that one can look very hard 
in American college libraries and bookstores and still find no mention of any aspect 
of the associational life of the Maori people of New Zealand. I know because I have. 
Yet, a fortuitous mailing of selected works of Sid Moko Mead has provided me with 
some tantalizing clues along this line (C.f. Mead, 1975). Recently, a study of mine 
which appeared in Voluntas presented evidence of a distinctive Buddhist commons 
characterized by organizational, fund-raising and philanthropic ideas and practices 
deeply rooted in tradition and history (Lohmann, 1995). In that same vein, I should 
like to offer a few tentative ideas on the possible existence of a multi-cultural 
commons in which justice for all and universal citizenship are co-existing themes 
and voluntary action based on common pooling of resources is the major agency. 
My original reasons for labeling as commons this broader category which 
includes, but is not limited to, nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations, 
were purely tactical and ethnocentric:  In my view, the German, Italian or French 
terms for the same phenomenon would do equally well as the English word 
commons, and if I understood Mr. Mead correctly, the Maori term hui may serve as 
well. One of the reasons I have come to prefer the term “commons” (aside from the 
obvious fact that I am speaking in English) is precisely because it points to what is 
a nearly-universal phenomenon:  a space in the community open to everyone’s use, 
with norms defining and limiting abuse, and frequently filled with gatherings 
characterized by talk. 
It is my general claim that village commons, voluntary associations, nonprofit 
corporations, waqfs, foundations and trusts, kanjin and capital campaigns, sangha, 
self-help and support groups, social movements and numerous other nonprofit, 
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charitable and philanthropic phenomena are part of a single large category of social 
phenomena distinct from families, markets and states.  
This view is anything but novel. Such a four-part classification is easily 
reconcilable with, not only the “third sector” view, (which assigns the family the 
dubious status of “fourth sector”) but also the basic United Nations economic 
classification system. Moreover, in their massive tome on Civil Society, Jean Cohen 
and Andrew Arato arrive at a similar classification, with the family and our “third 
sector” comprising the private sector and the political and economic realms making 
up the public (Cohen & Arato, 1992).  
Professor Mead’s recounting of Maui, the great cultural hero of the Maori world 
and his great deeds on behalf of mankind seems to me to point clearly toward the 
existence of some conception of philanthropic action in traditional Maori culture. 
The structure of iwi (tribal) and hapu (sub-tribal) organizations may point to some 
form of traditional ascriptive organization, or it may, as it does for many different 
Native American peoples, point to a complex system of voluntary associations, with 
complex rules for joining, initiation, obligations and rights of membership, and 
other matters. 
The Metropolitan Museum of Art exhibition of Maori art and cultural artifacts in 
1984, according to Mr. Mead, “launched Maori society and culture into the world” 
and into the Ta Papa Tongarewa national museum on the waterfront here in 
Wellington. Following the New York museum show, Te Maori Manaaki Taonga 
Trust was organized with funds left over from Te Maori to train future ethnologists, 
curators and exhibition designers. 
It is tempting here to see a clear case of modernization and diffusion:  The Maori 
“other” adopting the familiar repertory of foundation, or trust, funding to support 
training in what are clearly nonprofit occupations:  I don’t know how things are 
here, but ethnologists aren’t a hot commodity on the New York Stock Exchange. 
One can infer very similar things among the Navaho, Lakota, or Pueblo and 
other native peoples of the U.S., who have used nonprofit corporations as important 
instruments of tribal government. I would prefer to ask a more subtle question, and 
one which I, as a Pakeha, can probably never answer. Yet, I have no doubt that it is 
a question which should be important for those seeking to further the Maori 
cultural renaissance which the exhibition, book, museum, trust fund and Mr. 
Mead’s introduction all point:  What are the words and concepts, the beliefs, 
behaviors and institutions, which characterize the Maori commons?  In “Tribal Art 
as Symbols of Identity,” for example, Mr. Mead identifies the hapu  (sub-tribe) 
rather than the iwi, as the art-owning and art-producing social unit. This raises a 
question, well-known to museum curators everywhere, whether a dispute could 
arise between a particular hapu and its iwi over ownership of a particular art 
object, and how such a dispute would be resolved? 
Even though our original meaning of the term third world has broken down, we 
are all, in a certain sense, living in a third world today:  For some of us, it is a third 
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world in the sequence of pre-industrial, industrial, post-industrial. I suspect 
academics everywhere are dealing with implications of the sequence pre-modern (or 
primitive), modern and post-modern. It is also a third world in the sequence I have 
used here: colonial, cold-war, present. 
Failure Theory  
Many nonprofit scholars and advocates believe that an ad hoc proposition 
usually called “failure theory”, which was invented out of whole cloth a couple of 
decades ago, is sufficient to solve (or at least paper over) the problem and assign a 
rightful place for voluntary association in liberal theory. Failure theory is, of course, 
not a “theory” at all, but merely a single proposition. That proposition has it that a 
rather undefined conglomeration known as “the nonprofit sector” came into 
existence (and is sustained) under circumstances suggestive of institutional failures 
of government, or markets, or both. 
Fundamental to the two options posed by failure theory is the public-private 
dichotomy, which also appears frequently in the guise of the individual-state 
dichotomy. 
This second, related approach to the complications the private-public dichotomy 
creates for us is typically approached through the so-called “mediating institutions” 
approach, which is again a single proposition:  the realm of human freedom is 
created and protected because certain institutions, most notably the 
communications media and voluntary associations “mediate” between the 
autonomous individual, weak and alone, and the powerful state.  
Most recently, we have become intrigued with the civil society perspective. I 
wish to highlight two contributions in particular:  The Berger-Neuhaus project 
which has brought us the concept of ‘mediating institutions’ and the massive work 
on Civil Society by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato which makes the case for civil 
society in the continental tradition, and, in effect, corrects Tocqueville, Marx and 
Habermas by emphasizing the role of voluntary associations in constituting and 
sustaining public life and attempting to substitute social movements for the 
Marxian theory of revolutions, as an adequate basis for social change. 
Mediating Institutions in The Tribe of Alexis 
Peter Berger and John Neuhaus in a project funded by the Enterprise Institute 
in the late 1970’s fielded the concept of “mediating institutions” as what could be 
the core concept of the third sector.... The mediating institutions perspective usually 
attributed to Tocqueville by third-sector scholars is based entirely on a couple of 
paragraphs excerpted from English translations of his massive two-volume work 
Democracy in America. These are the widely recognized sentences, which I used as 
introductory epigrams at the beginning of chapters in The Commons (Lohmann, 
1992). 
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In Anglo political philosophy, while there is general agreement on the 
importance of Tocqueville’s work, there appears to be a major split over what it 
means, and its importance. Generally, the most ‘liberal’ political philosophers, 
scientists, commentators and practitioners (which is to say, those who emphasize 
the role of mediating institutions in buffering the individual from the state) 
generally tend to emphasize other aspects of his work, and largely ignore the brief 
segment on voluntary associations which tends, if anything, to upend their rugged 
individualism. In particular, the mediating roles of the market, the freedoms of 
speech and religion, and the mass media tend to draw particular attention. 
Business people, lawyers, journalists, and clergy are well represented among this 
group for obvious reasons. 
The main body of political philosophers writing in English has long tended to be 
of this ilk. The so-called nonprofit sector has, at best, an uncertain status within the 
main body of liberal political theory, sometimes making a cameo appearance but 
generally assigned a supporting role or (more likely) failing to appear at all. A quick 
examination of the indexes of any number of texts dealing with liberal political 
theory will confirm what we already know:  Concepts such as “civil society” and 
“associations, voluntary” appear infrequently, if at all. When they do appear, it is as 
secondary or derivative concepts of very narrow scope and with very narrow 
limitations. 
By contrast, more ‘communitarian’ political philosophers, scientists, pundits and 
practitioners tend to place greater emphasis on the mediating role of association, 
often to the virtual neglect of the other mediating forces identified by Tocqueville. 
These are the people whom Americans since the 1930’s have tended to identify as 
‘liberals’ and especially include large numbers of sociologists, social workers, public 
administrators, educators and others associated with ‘third sector’ research and 
practice.  
Generally, the ‘continental tradition’ of social and political theory from Hegel to 
Habermas (which also encompasses Marx, Weber and Durkheim) has had 
mediating institutions – although, except for Tocqueville, not voluntary associations 
– as a major preoccupation. Because continental social and political theory is largely 
in German, and to a lesser degree, other European languages, it is to varying 
degrees always just beyond the horizon of understanding for most of us Anglos, and 
we are reliant on translators and interpreters for assistance. Witness the dual 
concept of community as gemeinschaft and gesellschaft in which so much of the 
currently fashionable communitarian movement is grounded. 
It is, in fact, the recognition of the rather truncated attempts of the American 
pragmatists, particularly Dewey and Mead to update and, if you will, Anglicize that 
tradition which led me to attempt to develop the theory of the commons as I did. In 
this, I was heavily dependent on the perspectives and guidance I got from the work 
of Richard Bernstein (1971; 1976; 1981; 1985). 
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"The problem of associations, which is excluded from Habermas' analysis, is 
parallel to that of culture, to which it is linked through the structures of the public 
sphere. As Durkheim and Gramsci realized, the hostility of the modern state and 
economy to corporate bodies and associations could not block their reemergence and 
modernization. In this context, the bureaucratization of associations and the 
reemergence of pseudo-pluralist and corporatist forms of interest representation 
and aggregation, a key dimension of the fusion argument, cannot be considered the 
only tendency in contemporary associational life. The existence of an immense 
number of voluntary associations in all liberal democracies, the emergence of new 
ones in the context of corporatist bargaining, and their role in citizen initiatives and 
social movements may not demonstrate the somewhat one-sided Parsonian point 
that ours is the age of associations and not bureaucracy; but it is clear that 
legitimate left criticisms of a pluralist thesis that occludes the highly differential 
access of various types of associations to the political system should not close our 
eyes to the validity of this thesis against all claims of atomization and massification 
in our societies. The resilience of associations and the periodic revival of their 
dynamism can be explained through the modernization of the life world and its 
normative contribution to the scarce resource of solidarity."  (Cohen and Arato, 
2000, 461-462) 
Enduring Trait or Policy Artifact? 
Consider for a moment, if you will, the question of whether what we are 
currently studying in the third sector can be characterized as a real social 
phenomenon or merely an epiphenomenon; an artifact of recent social policy in our 
various countries:  A basic social fact or a continuation of the conflicts of the welfare 
state by other means? Many of our colleagues in the United States believe, quite 
sincerely, that research in this area should be organized around the concepts of 
something called – for lack of a real name – the “third” sector and another 
something called “the nonprofit organization”. I know a number of you well enough 
to know that you share in this view. Indeed, during the past two decades, a growing 
national and international network – a commons, if you will – of researchers and 
scholars nominally devoted to that proposition has grown up around the world and 
the attendance at this meeting is a clear indication of continuing interest.  
I have no serious quarrel with the day-to-day realities that these concepts of 
distinctive sectors and organizations point to. Moreover, national and international 
typologies, fluctuations in estimates of total giving by various national societies, the 
numbers and proportions of NPO’s or NGO’s claiming to have programming 
missions in particular topical areas, etc. Further, this is clearly an interdisciplinary 
topic, and getting some measure of basic agreement among researchers who are 
sociologists, social workers, lawyers, economists, public administrators and 
representatives of a dozen other fields is a daunting challenge, to say the least. 
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I do have some serious questions, however, about the adequacy of anchoring our 
interests in concepts such as the third sector and nonprofit organization, which 
seem to be both ethnocentric and anachronistic. Yet the question remains: Where in 
the larger schemes of things do the questions that currently interest us properly fit?  
Specifically, I wonder about the enduring validity or usefulness of concepts like the 
third sector and nonprofit organization. I wonder whether, in any sense,  these 
represent fundamental social categories, like family, group and state, or are they 
mere concepts of the moment; the conceptual by-products of contemporary public 
policy seeking to shift operations from government directly to what some have 
termed “the contract state” (Smith & Lipsky, 1992)? 
These are really questions of the long-term future direction of research in this 
field. Much of the research that has been done in the last two decades involves basic 
documentary or reportorial work: numbers of organizations; their various purposes; 
definitions for inclusion, exclusion and classification, etc. The recent emphasis in 
Aspen Foundation funding in the U.S., on validating the National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities (NTEE) well illustrates this trend. With the growth of this 
association, ISTR and other national and international bodies, we are seeing some 
serious, comparative research as well.  
But where does it all lead?  For some of us, no doubt, these trends point to 
improved practice in law, social work, public and nonprofit administration and 
other fields. For a number of researchers, this means careers and institutions 
devoted to institutional research -- on going measurement of fluctuations in 
donations, nonprofit spending, etc. I certainly do not wish to disparage such 
activities. Improving nonprofit practice... Accurate and timely understanding of the 
third sector has been among the most serious lacuna in macro-economic 
perspectives. 
Likewise, there will probably be a continuing need for tracking contemporary 
handling of voluntary associations, nonprofit corporations and other third-sector 
entities by various national and sub-national governmental bodies. If New Zealand 
and Australian, as well as American and Canadian legislators are allowing for the 
creation, expansion (or restriction), of a category of tax-exempt entities to further 
certain public purposes, then that’s an interesting political research question, of 
course. The question of why separate groups of politicians and political leaders in 
the English-speaking countries were suddenly inclined in the 1970s and 1980s to 
enable and encourage the creation of so many new nonprofits strikes me as equally 
interesting for both political science and social work. 
If, as may at the time of de Tocqueville’s celebrated journey to America, actually 
have been the case, contemporary legislators are acting in part in response to a 
common colonial heritage structured in large part by the English Statute of 
Charitable Uses, then that too is a matter of considerable interest for historians,  
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At the same time, if we continue to focus so narrowly on such a small band of 
activities, I am concerned that we will miss the implications of the full range of 
related phenomena and the importance of those phenomena for general social 
theory, but also for contemporary living. 
If those same Anglo-Saxon traditions are, in our time, being diffused to the rest 
of (the non-English speaking) world as Lester Salamon and others are suggesting, 
then we also have an interesting issue of inter-cultural contact and the diffusion of 
cultural practices. In this, the position of the United States, in particular, is a very 
peculiar one:  On the one hand, the domestic view of American exceptionalism, on 
the other hand, with the demise of the cold war, the international view of American 
imperialism.... 
However, it would be much more than just interesting if there were more to 
voluntarism and charity and philanthropy than the Anglo-Saxon traditions 
celebrated by de Tocqueville in the context of 19th century America, but also found 
in England and the other English-speaking colonies. 
What if most of those millions of immigrants coming to America, and Canada 
and to a lesser extent, to Australia and New Zealand from places other than 
England already possessed upon arrival a broad range of repertories of civic 
friendship, giving behavior, and uncoerced but organized, purposive association 
with others?  What if, in fact, the cultures they left back home were also rich in 
related ideas and practices?  What if charity and reciprocity and giving were not 
culturally indigenous at all, but were instead deeply engrained traits of a common 
human condition?  That, my friends, would be truly interesting, and provide some 
very deep footings upon which to erect a science of the third sector. 
At the very least, we should also be able to put third-sector events into a 
developmental sequence somewhat more realistic and relevant than the tired old 
modernization dramas of sociology -- whether Weberian, or Durkheimian or post-
industrial:  In my life-time the age of European colonialism ended, at least officially, 
with sometimes devastating and sometimes hopeful consequences for “the third 
world”.  
It should be noted that the thirdness of the third world is dramatically different 
than the thirdness of the third sector. What has become “the third world” arose 
originally out of an international association of non-aligned nations. The 
international age of colonialism was followed in short order after World War II by 
the bi-polar Cold War, with its expectation that everyone would side either with the 
“first” world of the industrial democracies or the “second” world of the socialist 
countries in the Russian empire. The third world originated in the ‘non-aligned’ 
movement, but the term still carries with it (at least in the U.S.) connotations of 
poverty, backwardness, underdevelopment, and overall “pre-modernness”. I live in 
the Appalachian mountain region of the Eastern U.S., where it is frequently said 
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that we have the economic conditions of a third world country. I assure you that is 
not intended as a compliment! 
What if, for example, we took the interesting phenomenon of organization of a 
Young Men’s Buddhist Association in Tokyo in the 1950’s to be evidence of the 
earliest stages of the “world wide associational revolution” which is supposedly 
occurring? (Salamon, 1993) Would this lead us to miss the fact that Japanese 
Buddhists were already skilled fund-raisers 800 years earlier?  Or, that Buddhist 
and Jainist concepts of the sangha as roughly an associative community of 
believers, are at least as old as Jewish concepts of community underlying the 
synagogue or the Christian concept of the “communion of saints”, and in no way a 
derivative of either. That this same concept of sangha was sufficiently vibrant to 
allow monks to live voluntarily in enduring monastic communities of up to 10,000 
monks for a thousand years before? 
If we failed to see the distinctive Buddhist traditions of philanthropy would we 
also miss the equally interesting Islamic foundations known as waqfs? (Hourani, 
1991; McChesney, 1991)  Or the long Confucianist traditions of village democracy in 
China, Korea, and Japan (Hahm, 1991)?  We would almost certainly miss the 
complex and nearly infinite variations of association and assembly throughout the 
non-Anglo world. 
One of the keys to a better understanding which I hope may emerge from the 
approach taken here is an improved understanding of the concept of the political 
“state”. The Anglo response has always indicated great suspicion of the continental 
approach to the state, both out of legitimate concerns over Hegel’s awe at Prussian 
bureaucracy and militarism, and out of lack of understanding (which I share!) of the 
Hegelian concept of Geist. Geist translates as inadequately into the English term 
spirit as gemeinschaft does into the English term community and much the same 
can be said of the concept of the state in the Anglo tradition of political philosophy. 
The practical impact of this inadequate conception can be seen in third sector 
discussions by Kramer, Wolch, and others. It seems pretty clear that references to 
the welfare state, shadow state, contract state, and the like in this context are 
specific to legislative, or more likely, executive and administrative organizations of 
government, and at times to the actions of dominant political coalitions and power 
groups. Any broader conception of “the state” which includes or can be related to 
worldviews, ideologies, or cultures (whether political or general).  
One way to accurately interpret the political and social position of Amerindians 
in the U.S., Aboriginals in Canada and Australia, Maoris in New Zealand would be 
to suggest that for much of the period since the establishment of these various 
nation-states, native peoples have not been part of the state, and often direct 
victims of it. The challenge now is to reformulate these various states actionable in 
terms of rights, associations and publics. 
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This is clear in the concept of citizenship, for example, where questions about 
justice to native peoples are often greeted with the statement “Well, they have the 
right to vote!  What else do they expect?” It is also clear with our concepts of justice, 
particularly with respect to justice to the indigenous peoples of the Anglo world. In 
the Anglo political traditions of our various nations, abstract concepts like justice, 
citizenship and social cohesion are ordinarily translated into individual rights, and 
to a lesser degree, obligations. The challenge facing those of us with academic and 
professional interests in commons is to translate those same concepts into the 
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